Yeshiva University, Cardozo School of Law

LARC @ Cardozo Law
AELJ Blog

Journal Blogs

9-27-2018

Does Missouri’s Video Service Providers Act Apply to Streaming
Services? Netflix Argues No.
Kayla Epstein
Cardozo Arts & Entertainment Law Journal

Follow this and additional works at: https://larc.cardozo.yu.edu/aelj-blog
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Epstein, Kayla, "Does Missouri’s Video Service Providers Act Apply to Streaming Services? Netflix Argues
No." (2018). AELJ Blog. 174.
https://larc.cardozo.yu.edu/aelj-blog/174

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journal Blogs at LARC @ Cardozo Law. It has been
accepted for inclusion in AELJ Blog by an authorized administrator of LARC @ Cardozo Law. For more information,
please contact christine.george@yu.edu, ingrid.mattson@yu.edu.

Does Missouri’s Video Service Providers Act
Apply to Streaming Services? Netflix Argues No.
BY KAYLA EPSTEIN/ ON SEPTEMBER 27, 2018

In August of this year the City of Creve Coeur, the named party in a class action, filed an
action against the video streaming services Netflix and Hulu for failing to comply with the
Video Services Providers Act, which was enacted by the state of Missouri in 2007.[1] The Act
enables a “franchise entity,” such as a town, to collect a fee from video service providers that
were previously authorized by the public commission.[2] The plaintiffs in this suit are at
minimum 40 Missouri municipalities.[3] This month Netflix responded with a motion to
dismiss for failure to state a claim.[4] Netflix contends that the service they provide does not
fall under the purview of what the statute is meant to regulate.[5] The motivation for the
lawsuit is clear: less money is coming in from the existing authorized video service providers
due to the fact that more people are switching over to using such services, and that loss is not
being made up for because the streaming services are not paying any fee to the
municipalities. According to the petition for declaratory judgment and other relief, by not
paying such fees, the political subdivisions in Missouri are being “deprive[d] . . . of much-

needed revenue.”[6] Whether or not Netflix is correct in believing the statute does not apply
to their services, and whether or not the municipalities are actually entitled to that, comes
down to reading and interpreting the actual statute at the center of the action.
§67.2679 of the Act not only describes the motivation behind the legislation, but also details
the procedure governing implementation.[7] § 67.2679(3) states, “[n]o person shall commence
providing video service or commence network in any area until such person has obtained a
state-issued video authorization.”[8] This authorization is only issued after it is ensured by the
person applying that they meet certain enumerated criteria.[9] The terms, “person,” “video
service authorization holder,” “applicant,” and, importantly, “video service provider,” are
seemingly used interchangeably throughout this section of the statute.[10] However, in §
67.2679, which specifically authorizes a municipality’s ability to collect the fee that is so
important here, only the term “video service provider” is used to describe the entity that the
fee can be collected from.[11] Therefore, based on that section, it appears you would need to
be considered a “video service provider” in order for this fee to be imposed.
This definition of “video service provider” is the basis of Netflix’s argument.[12] The definition
of “video service provider” in both the State and Creve Coeur laws is “any person that
distributes video service through a video service network pursuant to a video service
authorization”[13] (emphasis added). Netflix argues they are actually dependent on providing
a video service and are authorized because they are considered a video service provider, and
thus eligible to have the fee imposed.[14] Due to the fact that there is a specific dispute over
the definition of “video service,” I will first briefly discuss the argument surrounding
authorization. Netflix’s argument is simple: even if Netflix were to apply for authorization, they
could not successfully obtain it because they literally cannot meet certain requirements that
are listed.[15] Reading the plain language of the definition, it would appear that Netflix’s
argument is correct. Netflix can never act pursuant authorization because they cannot be
authorized. However, the court does not necessarily have to accept that interpretation. They
can look beyond the language of the statute. If the court believes the statute was still meant
to apply to streaming services like Netflix, the way “video service provider” is defined could
not be an automatic loss for the Missouri municipalities.
§67.2679 of the state statute provides, “Purpose statement – preemption of regulation of
video services – state-issued video services authorization required, procedure.”[16] This state
statute appears to use the term interchangeably with many other terms. More specifically, the
state statute doesn’t use the term “video service provider” when saying who has to apply in §
67.2679(3).[17] Therefore, even though the specific section on the actual fee only mentions
“video service provider,” it is possible that in looking at the entirety of the statute, one may
not accord significant weight to such exclusive use. In the alternative, the exact opposite could
be perceived because this term is singled out over the others and repeated use was chosen
for a reason. The bottom line is that there is still room to interpret and disagree despite
Netflix’s strong argument regarding the meaning and significance of “video service provider.”

The plaintiff does not even address the issue of whether or not the defendant is actually a
“video service provider.” Instead, the plaintiff relies on the definition of “video service” and
argues that because the defendants are required to pay the fee because they are providing a
video service within the meaning of the statute.[18] Netflix acknowledges the definition of
“video service” but argues that the exception within the definition specifically excludes
Netflix’s service. The statute defines video service as “the provision of video programming
provided through wireline facilities located at least in part in the public right-of-way without
regard to delivery technology, including internet protocol technology whether provided as
part of a tier, on demand, or a per-channel basis.”[19] (emphasis added). The plaintiff’s
petition explains the process that is required to use Netflix. It is made clear that neither
streaming service actually provides a customer direct public internet access.[20] As a result,
customers use their “internet-connected device” to send a request to a third-party internetservice provider when a customer wants to watch content. The third party internet-service
provider then forwards the request to the streaming services’ internet servers.[21] The thirdparty providers typically provide broadband internet service that are dependent on “wireline
facilities located in the public right-of-way,” just like what is described in the definition of
video service.[22] Thus, the plaintiff argues Netflix falls within the scope of the statute because
the streaming service is provided in a method explicitly stated in the statute.
However, the exception in the video service definition provides that the definition does not
include “…any video programming provided solely as part of and via a service that enables
uses to access content, information, electronic mail, or other services offered over the public
internet.”[23] Netflix argues that they fall directly into the exception as their services are those
that are offered over the public internet. On the other hand, Creve Coeur provides no direct
explanation and simply states in their petition that the services provided by Netflix do not fall
into this exception.[24] This again appears like a clear-cut victory for Netflix when looking at
the plain meaning of the statute. Their streaming services are exclusively available through the
public internet, even though they do not provide that internet themselves. It does not seem
likely that the statute was intended to exclude services over the public internet only if the
provider of such services was also the entity providing access to the internet. However, it is
ultimately up to the judge to decide if Netflix is excluded as a matter of law. If the judge does
grant Netflix’s motion for summary judgment, the state of Missouri would have to amend
their law in order to account for the ever-developing technology that is causing them to lose
what was once steady income to the municipalities.
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